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Vertical Restraints 
G.A. HAY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The topic of vertical restraints has generated a good deal of interest, 
discussion and controversy in recent years. Moreover, the recent publication 
of the US Justice Department’s ‘Vertical Restraints Guidelines’ ensures that 
the subject will continue to be discussed, both in the US and in those 
jurisdictions, like the UK and the EEC, which take competition policy 
seriously and normally show a keen interest in US developments. 
It seems appropriate, therefore, to consider these new Guidelines and to 
use them as a basis for discussion. At the outset, however, it is important to 
make a few comments about the structure of the US competition policy 
enforcement mechanism, lest the precise status of the Guidelines be 
misunderstood, and their short-run significance as a policy instrument 
exaggerated. 
Competition policy in the US is conducted primarily in the ‘judicial’ mode. 
A plaintiff sues a defendant and that lawsuit is adjudicated in a federal 
court.’ As in the UK and EEC, defendants are typically business corporations 
(although trade associations, non-profit organisations and even cities have 
been defendants in federal cases). However, while in the UK or the EEC a 
governmental body charged with enforcing competition policy is typically the 
moving party in a competition action of one kind or another, that is not so in 
the US. Long before the idea of ‘privatisation’ became fashionable in the 
UK, competition policy was effectively privatised in the US, making it 
possible for private plaintiffs to sue if they have been the victim of an anti- 
trust injury. 
I Many of the fifty states have their own anti-trust statutes for activity that is generally confined within 
state boundaries. These statutes are typically modelled on the federal laws, and state courts frequently 
refer to opinions in federal courts. 
* George Hay is Professor of Law and Economics at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York and was a 
Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College. Oxford during 1984/5. 
A version of this paper was given at the IFS conference on Regulation in London on 3 May 1985. 
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This is no mere theoretical possibility. A number of factors, including the 
generous provision for damages (actual damages as determined by the judge 
or jury are automatically trebledz), relatively efficient mechanisms for 
organising class actions, the ability of lawyers to represent plaintiffs on a 
contingent fee basis, and the fact that unsuccessful plaintiffs typically are not 
required to pay the winning defendant’s legal fees3 all combine to genqate 
substantial incentives for private parties to seek legal remedies for anti-trust- 
related injuries. The result is that the federal enforcement agencies (the 
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission4) are plaintiffs in 
typically less than 10 per cent of ‘federal’ anti-trust cases fded in a given year. 
The important aspect of this structure, for purposes of the present 
discussion, is that the Guidelines state merely the enforcement intentions of 
the Justice Department. They are in no sense binding on private plaintiffs,$ 
which have been responsible for virtually all vertical restraint cases filed in 
the past several years.6 Nor are the Department’s views binding on the courts 
that adjudicate private cases. Federal judges are appointed for life and 
thoroughly independent of the Justice Department. 
On the surface, then, it might appear that the Guidelines are of little 
consequence, given the predominance of private action in the area of vertical 
restraints. But the very paucity of government cases in this area suggests that 
the purpose of the Guidelines is other than merely a codification of past 
policy. Indeed, the document acknowledges explicitly that the real purpose of 
the Guidelines is to contribute to the orderly development of case-law, i.e. to 
influence judicial opinions in private cases. While the views of Justice are not 
binding on federal judges, they can be influential. Hence, the document does 
more than simply state the Department’s conclusions; it attempts to argue the 
case for those conclusions in as clear and convincing a manner as possible. 
The hope is that the document itself, combined with the weight of authority 
Private plaintiffs may also seek and obtain injunctive relief. There is some controversy at the moment 
over whether private plaintiffs can obtain divestiture by the defendant or dissolution. 
The policy is not symmetrical. Losing defendants pay the successful plaintiffs’ fees, further increasing 
the incentive to sue. 
‘ The Federal Trade Commission was established in 1914, and enjoys jurisdiction roughly corresponding 
to that of the Justice Department. It is perhaps fitting that the same Congress which determined that 
competition among business entities would be desirable also decreed that there should be competition 
among federal agencies to enforce the anti-trust laws, notwithstanding the fact that it had already made it 
possible for private entities to bring anti-trust actions as well. 
The FTC is not bound by the Justice Department Guidelines, but its policy is unlikely to differ 
significantly from that of the Justice Department. 
In this respect the previously issued Merger Guidelines are in a different posture, since merger cases 
brought by private plaintiffs are somewhat rare, and the attitude of the Justice Department is often 
critical to whether the merger will take place. 
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behind it, will persuade the judiciary to adopt similar conclusions. For that 
reason, the Guidelines merit serious discussion. 
This paper has three main sections. After some introductory definitions in 
Section 11, Section I11 provides a brief history of the American case-law 
involving vertical restraints. In Section IV, the Guidelines are summarised 
and explained. Section V raises questions about the Guidelines’ treatment of 
vertical restraints that are suggested by recent developments in the industrial 
organisation literature. In a brief concluding section, the relevance and likely 
impact of the Guidelines for UK and EEC policy towards vertical restraints 
are assessed. 
11. A TAXONOMY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
Vertical restraints, in general, are conditions imposed by a manufacturer on 
its distributors or retail dealers. Prominent examples include resale price 
maintenance, where the retail dealer is constrained from selling below the 
retail price stipulated by the manufacturer; territorial allocation, where the 
distributor is required to confine its sales efforts to a particular geographic 
area; and exclusive dealing, where the distributor or retailer is forbidden to 
carry the products of a competing manufacturer. Occasionally, vertical 
restraints on the distributor/retailer are combined with self-imposed 
constraints on the manufacturer; for example, territorial allocation is often 
accompanied by an agreement that the manufacturer will not appoint 
competing dealers in the same territory. 
There are many possible ways of categorising vertical restraints. For 
present purposes, a useful taxonomy is according to the nature of the anti- 
competitive effect that allegedly may arise from vertical restraints. According 
to this scheme, there are two basic types. In the first, called ‘exclusionary 
vertical restraints’, the potential victims are competing manufacturers that 
are denied access to desirable wholesale or retail outlets. Exclusive dealing is a 
prototypical example. If a particularly desirable set of distributors or retailers 
agrees to deal exclusively with a single manufacturer, competing 
manufacturers are denied access and must seek alternative distributing or 
retail outlets or must develop their own. This may be a particular problem for 
smaller manufacturers or potential new entrants by making it difficult to 
achieve minimum efficient scale or by otherwise increasing their costs. 
The second type of vertical restraint has its immediate effect on intrabrand 
competition at the distributor or retail level. By one means or another, the 
manufacturer restricts competition among its own wholesale or retail dealers, 
e.g. by confining them to operate within their assigned (often exclusively 
assigned) territories or by directly specifying a minimum retail price. As 
indicated, the immediate impact is confined to intrabrand competition. There 
is no necessary adverse impact on other manufacturers; indeed, if anything, it 
might appear that competing manufacturers would benefit from the 
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restriction in competition among a particular rival’s dealers. 
While the Guidelines refer to both categories of restraint,’ much of the 
recent controversy has involved the second, i.e. intrabrand restraints, and 
this will be the primary focus of this paper. To understand the controversy, a 
small amount of historical background is appropriate. 
111. THE LEGAL STATUS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS IN THE US, 1911-85 
From at least 1911 up until 1977, the judicial attitude towards most vertical 
restraints, and especially resale price maintenance, was a hostile one. Indeed, 
prior to the Sylvania decision in 1977, most vertical restraints of the type 
discussed here (i.e. intrabrand restraints) were regarded as illegalperse, i.e. if 
the existence of the restraint was established, there was no further defence 
argument permitted. 
There were two bases for the Courts’ hostile attitude towards vertical 
restraints. The first, based on common-law notion of restraint upon 
alienation, regarded it as improper for the manufacturer to impose any 
conditions, once it had passed title to the goods, on the subsequent resale of 
those goods.’ The second, and more interesting, basis was by analogy to the 
legal and economic consequences of horizontal restraints. It was settled 
doctrine, both in law and in economics, that a horizontal agreement among 
distributors or retailers not to deviate from a particular price or not to 
infringe on one another’s customers or geographical territories, would be 
against the public interest and illegal per se. It followed, according to the 
analogy, that if the same restraint occurred as a result of a vertical agreement 
between manufacturer and dealers, the economic consequences would be the 
same as for a horizontal agreement and therefore the same legal treatment 
would be warranted. 
’ The Guidelines deal also with tie-in sales, which, analytically at least. can be viewed as a form of vertical 
restraint. But the Guidelines’ treatment of tie-ins is both separate from and dissimilar to its treatment of 
vertical restraints. 
’ This is admittedly a substantial oversimplification of the complex and shifting set of rules that 
developed during the period. A variety of exceptions and special circumstances were recognised (and 
often subsequently disallowed) at various times during the &-year period. The most significant 
exception, however, was statutory, not judicially-created. During the period 1937-75, many states passed 
‘fair-trade’ laws creating, under certain circumstances, an exemption from federal anti-trust laws for a 
manufacturer that wished to impose minimum retail prices on its dealers. In 1975, Congress revoked the 
exemption. For a more complete history of the development of the legal rules, see Hay (1985b). 
It has been argued that the Courts misinterpreted and exaggerated the sweep of this common-law 
doctrine. See Hay (1985b). 
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(At least) by 1960, economists began seriously to question the analogy and 
the policy conclusions that followed from the analogy. The ‘new’ analysis 
took two (interrelated) lines of argument.’O The first pointed out that, ceteris 
paribus, it would not be rational for a manufacturer to restrict competition 
among its retail dealers (or distributors), since doing so would serve only to 
increase the retailers’ margins and the retail price, with the result that sales of 
the manufacturer’s product would fall. Hence, such vertical restraints should 
be expected only when there is some other element in the picture. The higher 
retail (gross) margins must induce some special behaviour by the retailers 
which, by stimulating demand, more than compensates for the reduction in 
sales due to higher retail prices. 
The second line of argument identified the nature of this other element. 
Certain demand-generating activities that retail dealers (or distributors) 
might usefully perform, such as elaborate showrooms, demonstration 
facilities and other pre-sale services, are effective in generating demand but 
costly to undertake. The increased sales would more than compensate for the 
retailer’s greater expenses but for the ‘ free-rider’ effect which permits other 
retailers to take advantage of the demand-generating activities of industrious 
retailers by siphoning off the customers that have been induced to buy. This 
occurs because the free-riders have lower costs (since they do not themselves 
provide the pre-sale services even though they benefit) and hence can offer 
lower retail prices. 
Over the long run, the bulk of the sales shifts to the free-riders, resulting in 
losses for the industrious retailers and, eventually, cessation of the demand- 
generating activity. The manufacturer can prevent this from happening, 
according to the argument, by insulating the industrious dealers from the 
price competition of free-riders, either by limiting the number of retailers (or 
distributors) serving a territory (possibly even creating local monopolies) or 
by directly preventing price competition, i.e. specifying the minimum retail 
price. 
If the story is as described, the vertical restraints are potentially pro- 
competitive, since the consumer presumably benefits enough from the extra 
services that are made possible to more than compensate for the nominally 
higher retail prices, Indeed, unless the positive impact on sales of the extra 
services does exceed the negative impact of higher retail prices, the 
manufacturer would not find it worthwhile to impose the restraints. Hence 
there ought to be a presumption, according to the argument, that the 
restraints are pro-competitive. 
Two exceptions to this presumption were identified, however. First, the 
manufacturer may be coerced into ‘imposing’ the restraints by collective 
pressure from dealers who in turn desire to be ‘restrained’ from competing 
with one another at the wholesale or retail level. This would be in the 
l o  The classic reference is Telser (1960). 
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manufacturer's interest only because the threatened alternative was a 
collective refusal by the dealers to handle the manufacturer's products. The 
second exception was that the restraints might be simultaneously employed 
by several competing manufacturers. By ensuring the absence of intrabrand 
competition at the retail level, the restraints might remove a possible source 
of pressure on a tacit or explicit cartel at the manufacturing level. 
In one sense, neither of these scenarios is an exception since, at base, they 
are primarily horizontal, not vertical, restraints and could be attacked under 
the normal strict rules governing horizontal agreements. However, such 
horizontal agreements are typically covert, and difficult to discover. In 
addition, they may be tacit rather than explicit and less susceptible to legal 
condemnation even though the economic impact is the same as an explicit 
cartel. For either reason, it might be good policy to disallow vertical restraints 
in circumstances where they are likely to facilitate a horizontal impact. 
Unfortunately, the economics literature provided little guidance on how 
courts should decide whether the use of vertical restraints posed a sufficiently 
large risk of facilitating horizontal collusion, compared to the efficiency- 
creating effects, that they should be disallowed. It appeared as though, in 
order to decide the issue, a court would have to undertake fairly detailed and 
sophisticated analyses of the nature of the product and the structure and 
behaviour of the industry in question. For reasons discussed in detail 
elsewhere, ' I  American anti-trust courts historically have avoided such 
complicated inquiries, and have tended to rely on fairly straightforward and 
simple rules-of-thumb. Faced with the difficulty of incorporating the relevant 
economics into simple rules, the rule of per se illegality for all vertical 
restraints continued to seem the most attractive alternative in the 
circumstances. l2 
Eventually, however, the academic literature on vertical restraints had 
reached such a volume that it was impossible to ignore entirely. Hence, in the 
Syfvania decision in 1977, the Supreme Court, citing much of the relevant 
literature, abandoned blanket per se illegality for all vertical restraints in 
favour of a new set of rules; henceforth, vertical price restraints would 
continue to be unlawful per se, but non-price restraints would be subject to 
rule of reason analysis. 
While the authors cited in the SyZvania opinion might have taken pride in 
the fact of their being cited and pleasure at the Court's acknowledgement of 
the importance of economic analysis, they would not have awarded uncritical 
acclaim to the new set of rules, since there is little in the literature to suggest 
the wisdom of fundamentally different treatment of price and non-price 
I '  See Hay (1984, 1985a). 
I* This is only one of several possible explanations for the reluctance of the courts to be guided by the 
economics literature. 
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restraints. Indeed, most economists would have regarded them as analytically 
more or less equivalent, each designed to protect the industrious deder from 
free-riders , by limiting the opportunities for price competition. 
Two other problems were quickly discovered with the Sylvania result. 
First, there was nothing to tell subsequent courts how precisely to distinguish 
price .and non-price restraints. While a formal agreement by the dealer to 
adhere to suggested prices is clear enough to interpret, many other nominally 
non-price conditions are intended to achieve the same impact, i.e. insulation 
of the dealer from price competition. Are they to be classified by the words 
actually used in the agreement or by the intended and actual impact? The 
problem is made even more acute as a result of the sharply different legal 
treatment accorded price and non-price restraints, since plaintiffs have an 
incentive to characterise every restraint as a price restraint. l 3  
The second problem is that, for non-price restrictions, the Sylvania Court 
gave no instructions as to how to conduct a rule of reason analysis. The 
Court mentioned something about balancing the loss in intrabrand 
competition against the improvement in interbrand competition without 
explaining either why such a trade-off makes sense'' or how it is to be 
assessed. 
IV. THE GUIDELINES' APPROACH TO VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
Had the Justice Department been entirely free to say what its officials 
believed, it is likely that the Vertical Restraints Guidelines would have 
attempted to deal both with the dubious value of the pricehon-price 
distinction and the issue of how to evaluate the overall competitive impact of 
individual non-price restraints. But, for political reasons too complex to 
explain here, the Department elected not to take issue with the wisdom 
of the per se rule for price re~traints .~~ Hence, save for one brief section 
indicating the difficulty of distinguishing between price and non-price 
I 3  In a quite remarkable passage in a recent opinion, the Supreme Court acknowledged the possible 
artificiality of the distinction while maintaining its importance: 
but the economic effect of ... agreements on price and non-price restrictions - is in many, but not 
all, cases similar or identical. ... And judged from a distance, the conduct of the parties in the 
various situations can be indistinguishable. ... Nevertheless, it is of considerable importance that . . . concerted action on non-price restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing agreements, since 
under present law the latter are subject to per se treatment and treble damages. 
(Momanto Co. v Spray-Rite Sen. Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1464,1470,1984) 
For an argument that the trade-off does not make sense, see Easterbrook (1984), pp.13-14. 
I s  Two years earlier, the Department made clear that it regarded the per se rule as unwarranted but was 
threatened by Congress with severe political and financial consequences if it continued to express the view 
as an official opinion. 
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restraints, the Guidelines are limited to the question of how to assess the 
legality of non-price restraints, i.e. how to interpret the court’s mandate to 
perform a rule of reason analysis. 
What distinguishes the Guidelines, and what increases the likelihood of 
their being influential on courts that are disinclined to get involved in any 
complex economic analysis, is that they go beyond merely identifying and 
describing the possibilities for pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects. 
Instead, they are intended to offer relatively simple and easily applied rules- 
of-thumb, based on data presumed to be available to courts, to screen out 
without elaborate economic analysis those situations in which vertical 
restraints are likely to be primarily efficiency-creating. Detailed analysis is 
left only for those restraints that fail to pass this initial screen, and even that 
analysis is largely confined to examining various observable structural 
characteristics of the industry. 
To perform the screen, the Guidelines define two concepts. The first, called 
the Vertical Restraints Index (VRI) is analogous to the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index (HHI) used in the Merger Guidelines. It is calculated by 
squaring the market share of each firm in the market that is a party to a 
contract or other arrangement that contains the vertical restraint and then 
summing the values obtained for firms at the same level of operations (i.e. 
supplier or dealer);I6 the maximum value that the VRI can take is therefore 
loo2 = 10,Ooo. 
The second concept, called the coverage ratio, is the percentage of each 
market involved in a restraint. For example, if ten suppliers, each with 5 per 
cent market shares, employ a restraint, the coverage ratio is 50 per cent, 
Hence the VRI could be low (because the industry is not highly concentrated) 
while, at the same time, the coverage ratio is high (since virtually all firms 
employ the restraint). 
Using these two concepts, the screen operates as follows. The use of a 
vertical restraint will not be challenged if (i) the firm employing the restraint 
has a market share of 10 per cent or less; or (ii) the VRI is under 1200 and the 
coverage ratio is below 60 per cent in the same market (which can be either 
the supplier or dealer market); or (iii) the VRI is under 1200 in both relevant 
markets; or (iv) the coverage ratio is less than 60 per cent in both markets. 
The first test simply provides a safe harbour for small firms on the theory 
that they are unlikely to be prominent in any cartel or in any effort to 
facilitate a cartel. The remaining tests are based on the assumption that the 
restraints are unlikely to facilitate collusion (or to have an exclusionary 
impact) unless the relevant markets are highly concentrated and the practice 
is widely used. For situations where the restraints are not immunised with this 
l6 For example, if three of four manufacturers, each with a 25 per cent market share, employ a restraint, 
theVRI = 25’ + 25* + 25’ = 1875. 
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structural screen, the Guidelines suggest a further examination, focusing 
primarily on ease of entry and other factors that would render collusion more 
or less likely, but including other evidence that may shed light on the likely 
net competitive impact of the restraints.” 
V. THE GUIDELINES AND RECENT ECONOMIC THEORY 
There are a number of mechanical ambiguities about the Guidelines’ 
analysis,” but these are likely to be resolved in subsequent clarifications by 
the Department. In addition, there will be reservations about whether the 
data to perform the calculations are likely to be available in litigation 
involving only a single manufacturer. Finally, the overall level of the 
numerical criteria may be questioned, i.e. perhaps all the numbers should be 
lower (it is hard to see how they could possibly be higher). 
The most interesting questions, however, relate to whether the Guidelines, 
in isolating the risk of collusion at the manufacturing or dealer level, have 
properly accounted for all the important kinds of adverse impacts that may 
flow from the use of vertical restraints. This possibility is suggested by several 
factors. First, casual empirical observation (based partly on periods in 
various countries when legal prohibitions on vertical restraints, especially 
resale price maintenance, were not in force) suggests that for many of the 
products for which manufacturers have desired to isolate retailers from price 
competition, the pre-sale service, free-rider explanation seems not to fit 
easily. The most frequently commented-upon example (from the US) is blue 
jeans, where the principal manufacturer was a staunch defender of resale 
price maintenance and other ways of minimising dealer price competition. It 
is difficult to see precisely what kind of elaborate pre-sale service might be 
provided for blue jeans that is seriously threatened by free-riders. 
Recent research by Marvel and McCafferty (1984) sheds some light on this 
puzzle. They argue that when a particular dealer, with a reputation for 
quality (or perhaps for being a trendsetter in fashion), carries a 
manufacturer’s product, the demand for that product is increased as a result 
of the retailer’s implicit stamp of approval. Once the demand has been 
generated, other retailers benefit, since by offering the product at a reduced 
” For example, if the restraints have been in existence for some time, the Guidelines suggest an effort to 
evaluate the actual impact. Other evidence may come from documents indicating the intent of the parties 
or other evidence suggesting the plausibility of a pro-competitive impact. Finally, the Guidelines suggest 
that if many of the firms using restraints have small shares or are recent entrants, the restraints are most 
likely to have an efficiency explanation. 
I s  For example, it may be asked how it is possible for the coverage ratio to be high in the supplier market 
but low in the retail market (and vice versa), since each restraint involves both a supplier and a retailer. 
Conceivably, it applies to a situation where a supplier imposes restraints on some, but not all, of its 
retailers, but this is not made clear. 
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price, they can free-ride on the quality certification activities of the 
industrious retailer. To the extent that the original retailer, to perform this 
quality certification function, must incur higher costs (say, by testing or 
expensive market research), the viability of the activity is threatened. Hence a 
manufacturer may wish to insulate such a dealer from free-riders, by either 
some form of territorial protection (unlikely for items such as blue jeans), 
resale price maintenance, or simply refusing to supply the kind of discount 
stores that are most likely to pose a serious free-rider problem.I9 
To the extent that what is occurring is genuine quality certification, most 
economists would regard the activity as desirable and worthy of protection. 
Where the activity is more accurately described as fashion-setting, arguments 
about changing tastes and artificial differentiation are involved, and 
economists may feel that less can be said in defence of restraints on economic 
grounds. However, the Guidelines are not at all hostile to this type of reason 
for vertical restraints, at least on the initial screen. For those situations which 
fail to gain clearance at the initial screen, the only way the issue might arise is 
whether, in considering the manufacturer’s explanation of the need for such 
restraints, the quality certification argument is afforded parity with the more 
traditional reasons. 
A second area of concern about the economic consequences of vertical 
restraints is suggested by Scherer (1983) who argues that while, for any one 
manufacturer, vertical restraints may increase demand, a large chunk of the 
increase may not represent a net expansion in the industry’s output, but 
merely a shift from one manufacturer to another. Moreover, he argues, if 
other manufacturers react by instituting similar restraints to stem the loss of 
business, the net result may resemble the original equilibrium in terms of 
market shares, i.e. no significant increase in overall demand, yet with the 
product being sold at higher prices (to cover the increased costs of the 
additional dealer services that are generated). 
What is not explained is whether, if the added value to the consumer is less 
than the added costs, the high-price, high-service outcome is a true 
equilibrium. Put differently, it appears that a firm which deviated from the 
pattern and offered a low-service, low-price version of the product would 
attract those consumers for whom the retail services are not worth the higher 
price. New entry could, of course, accomplish the same result. 
Notwithstanding, if one accepts Scherer’s view of the potential disutility of 
such activities, a circumstance which might generate an undesirable result but 
would not be picked up by the Guidelines would be one in which 
concentration is low, but the coverage ratio nonetheless quite high.,, (If the 
l 9  Obviously, there may be circumstances in which the quality retailer does not incur additional product- 
related expenses, or is not seriously threatened by free-riders since shoppers will patronise the store 
anyway. 
*O One could still argue that the overall levels of the coverage ratio and the VRI criteria are too high, but 
that argument seems insensitive to whether the concern is collusion or excessive differentiation. 
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VRI is below the critical level in both supplier and dealer markets, firms using 
restraints escape further scrutiny even where all suppliers or all dealers are 
governed by the restraints. Moreover, any firm with less than 10 per cent is 
automatically exempt.) However, it could be argued that, whatever the 
overall merits of Scherer’s hypothesis, the likelihood of a destructive 
equilibrium of the type envisaged by Scherer is especially remote when 
concentration is low. 
A different, but related, argument comes out of recent literature on 
product differentiation,z1 since one can view vertical restraints as facilitating 
product differentiation. It has been established that, under a given set of 
assumptions, firms can reach an equilibrium in which there is excessive 
differentiation relative to some social optimum.22 The relevance of this 
dilemma to the vertical restraints issue is unclear, partly because theory does 
not predict excessive differentiation as a universal outcome and partly 
because the theoretical comparison is to the social optimum. For vertical 
restraints, the appropriate bench-mark is the situation that would exist under 
a stricter policy towards such restraints, which does not necessarily mean the 
first-best equilibrium. 
As in the previous discussion, the problem, to the extent that there is one, is 
most likely to be serious when most firms employ the restraint to accomplish 
differentiation. Where a significant percentage of producers offer the 
‘undifferentiated’ model, the risk of an unfavourable equilibrium seems 
more remote. 23 The Guidelines fail to isolate potentially troublesome 
situations in circumstances where the coverage is complete but industry 
concentration modest. This of course stems from the Guidelines’ emphasis 
on the risk of collusion. The problem would be cured if a low coverage ratio 
were necessary, not merely sufficient, to immunise the industry from the 
second level scrutiny, i.e. if all situations with very high coverage ratios were 
subject to further examinat i~n.~~ 
*’ See, e.g.. Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
** It is important to stress that this is not a general result but highly conditional on the assumptions. 
Under a different set of assumptions, the equilibrium has insufficient differentiation. 
Although this will depend on the degree of substitution between the high-priced products and the 
homogeneous substitute. For a model which allows for a portion of the industry to produce the 
hbmogeneous good, see M o p  (1979). 
** This is not intended to imply that Situations where the coverage !atio is quite high are necessarily 
inefficient. Indeed, when most or all f m s  are following the Same business practice, it is likely to be the 
case that this is an efficient way of doing business. 
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V1. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK AND THE EEC 
The issue that remains is the relevance of the Guidelines for competition 
policy outside the US, especially in the UK and the EEC. As far as the EEC is 
concerned, it seems fair to say that the Guidelines would be totally 
unacceptable at the present time. Because the EEC is equally concerned 
about market integration and about manufacturer or dealer collusion, it is 
unlikely to sanction any kind of intrabrand restraints used to achieve (or 
perpetuate) different prices in different member states. 
This policy seems not dependent on the manufacturer being in any sense 
dominant, or on concentration being high enough to make manufacturer 
collusion a serious risk. In the US, absent market power at the manufacturing 
level, it is highly unlikely that even airtight exclusive distributorships will lead 
to significant differences in price across states, since interbrand competition 
will force prices to  the common competitive level.’* For the EEC, in contrast, 
various countries’ specific regulations (e.g. price controls) may generate 
significant country price differences that will not be eroded by interbrand 
competition (if all manufacturers in a country are governed by the same rules) 
but may be undermined by parallel intrabrand imports. Hence, while the 
Guidelines provide a safe harbour for a small manufacturer (10 per cent or 
less market share) or a manufacturer in a relatively unconcentrated industry 
to impose airtight territorial allocations on its dealers, such behaviour would 
run afoul of Article 85(1) and would almost certainly not be exempted under 
85(3); nor would it come under the block exemption for exclusive distribution 
since the latter cannot be used to prevent or discourage parallel imports. 
In addition, to the extent that the Justice Department’s ‘hidden agenda’ is 
to have similar rules apply to resale price maintenance, the policy is likely to 
be unacceptable in the EEC.26 This is partly due to the market integration 
factor just mentioned. While in the US resale price maintenance is likely to be 
employed to produce uniform retail prices nation-wide, in the Community 
resale price maintenance may be simply another tool for price discrimination 
across member states. 
However, an additional factor that appears to motivate EEC policy is the 
relative infancy, and possible fragility, of the discount store phenomenon. 
That is, it may be perceived that there is a genuine risk that in an environment 
permissive of retail price maintenance, the power of the traditional dealer 
network is such that, even without collusion on the part of dealers, 
manufacturers would feel pressured to avoid selling to discounters. In the 
US, discount stores are so well established, and account for such a large 
Some differences might persist, related perhaps to transportation costs or state-specific regulatory 
requirements (e.g. stricter emissions standards for cars in California), but these are not likely to be 
overcome by parallel intrabrand imports in any event. 
*6 On this subject see Waelbroeck (1984). 
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portion of many manufacturers' sales, that a full-scale return to retail price 
maintenance is unlikely even if it were expressly permitted. 
As for the UK, it is possible to argue that the UK has already gone well 
beyond the Guidelines in immunising non-price vertical restraints. Properly 
drafted agreements awarding exclusive distributorships or assigning exclusive 
geographic territories are not registrable under the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act. In addition, while vertical practices may be picked up under the Fair 
Trading Act or the more recent Co petition Act, this should happen only for 
dominant firms, almost certainly "tg re uiring more than the 10 per cent safe 
harbour allowed under the Guidelines. 
There are two important caveats to this picture of apparently quite lenient 
treatment. First, the market definition standards employed in the Vertical 
Restraints Guidelines are the same as those contained in the 1984 Merger 
Guidelines. It has been clearly demonstrated that these produce markets that, 
in general, are much broader than those implicit in traditional product and 
geographical market definitions based on existing patterns of consumer 
substitution, imports, and supply cross-elasti~ities,~' which are the ones likely 
to be used by the OFT or MMC. 
Second, dominance has been defined to include market shares as low as 30 
per cent. Under the Guidelines, a firm with 30 per cent market share would be 
protected if the overall coverage ratio for firms using such vertical restraints 
were less than 60 per cent. This occurs because, under the Guidelines, 
eliminating intrabrand competition is not offensive in and of itself, but only 
where it is the result of dealer collusion or serves to facilitate manufacturer or 
dealer collusion. Since the UK need not be individually concerned about 
market integration, it might be influenced to move closer to the Guidelines' 
approach on this issue. 
Finally, with respect to resale price maintenance, the present rules seem 
roughly comparable to the per se treatment under US case-law. It is unlikely 
that the UK would be receptive to any suggestion that the rules on resale price 
maintenance be relaxed, for some of the same reasons given for the EEC, 
namely the perceived fragility of the discount store revolution and the fear 
that, freed from legal prohibition, manufacturers would bow to the implicit 
pressure for traditional retailers to insulate them from the price competition 
of discount stores. 
27 See Hay and Reynolds (1985). 
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